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Abstract—While the nascent Cloud Computing paradigm 
supported by virtualization has the upward new notion of 
edges, it lacks proper security and trust mechanisms. Edges 
are like on demand scalability and infinite resource 
provisioning as per the ‘pay-as-you-go’ manner in favour of a
single information owner (abbreviated as INO from now 
onwards) to multiple corporate INOs. While outsourcing 
information to a cloud storage controlled by a cloud service 
provider (abbreviated as CSP from now onwards) relives an 
information owner of tackling instantaneous oversight and 
management needs, a significant issue of retaining the control 
of that information to the information owner still needs to be 
solved. This paper perspicaciously delves into the facts of the 
Cloud Computing security issues and aims to explore and 
establish a secure channel for the INO to communicate with 
the CSP while maintaining trust and confidentiality. The 
objective of the paper is served by analyzing different 
protocols and proposing the one in commensurate with the 
requirement of the security property like information or data 
confidentiality along the line of security in Cloud Computing 
Environment (CCE). To the best of our knowledge, we are the 
first to derive a secure protocol by successively eliminating the 
dangling pitfalls that remain dormant and thereby hamper 
confidentiality and integrity of information that is worth 
exchanging between the INO and the CSP. Besides, 
conceptually, our derived protocol is compared with the SSL 
from the perspectives of work flow related activities along the 
line of secure trusted path for information confidentiality.
Keywords-secure channel; confidentiality; token; mediated 
authnetication.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cloud computing is for internet computing [1]. The 
internet is commonly visualized as clouds; hence the term 
“cloud computing” is for computation done through the 
Internet. Cloud computing provides the facility to access 
shared resources and common infrastructure, offering 
services on demand over the network to perform operations 
that meet changing business needs. The location of physical 
resources and devices being accessed are typically not 
known to the end user. 
Information is the most important part of Cloud 
Computing; thus, data or information security is the top 
most priority in all the data operations of Cloud Computing. 
Here, all the data are backed up at multiple locations. A full-
fledged overview of cloud computing has been depicted in 
[4,16] as mentioned below.
A Cloud is a type of parallel and distributed system 
consisting of a collection of inter-connected and virtualized 
computers that are dynamically provisioned and presented 
as one or more unified computing resource(s) based on 
service-level agreements established through negotiation 
between the service provider and consumers.
The above points have been highlighted in the following 
view of cloud computing as outlined in [6].
Cloud computing is a model for enabling convenient, on-
demand network access to a shared pool of configurable 
computing resources (e.g., networks, servers, storage, 
applications, and services) that can be rapidly provisioned 
and released with minimal management effort or service 
provider interaction. This cloud model promotes availability 
and is composed of five essential characteristics, three 
service models, and four deployment models.
Salient contributions of the paper are as follows:
 Understanding the need for establishing secure channel 
between information owner (INO) and cloud service 
provider (CSP) to get rid of an adversary.
 Understanding the components and the requirement for 
establishing secure channel.
 Finding methods for establishing secure channel after 
successive refinement. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II
shows an overview of Cloud Computing entities and an 
abstract scenario followed by a subsection stating the 
problem to be addressed throughout the paper. Section III
and its associated subsection discuss the design and solution 
of the proposed scheme. Section IV illustrates pictorial 
interactions between INO and CSP with successive 
refinement leading to the evolution of the proposed scheme. 
Section V discusses dynamic information handling support. 
Section VI analytically illustrates the confidentiality and 
security strength of the proposed scheme over SSL for 
secure channel set up by taking an adversary into account 
from different perspectives. Section VII highlights related 
works, rationale and motivation behind the theme of the 
paper. Section VIII covers conclusion with limitations and 
hints for future work.
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II. OBSERVATION
The INO and the CSP need to establish a secure channel 
for any steps necessary for storing and retrieving information 
in particular and transferring information between INO and 
CSP in general as shown in Figure 1.
Figure 1. A view of Cloud Computing Environment.
While transferring information, secure channel protects 
information from malicious activities by an adversary 
impersonating either the CSP or the INO.
A. Problem Statement
Problem statement derived from the literature review 
and the observation is expressed as the following 
tantamount research question.
How do we establish secure channel between the INO 
and the CSP to maintain trust and confidentiality?
III. DESIGN METHODOLOGY
Different cryptographic principles have been analytically 
explored with pictorial representations. Relevant critical 
issues have been synthesized to refine each principle to 
produce a salient protocol that analytically serves the 
purpose desired in the Cloud Computing Environment.
A. Aim and Objective of the Paper
The Aim is to establish secure communication channel
through authentication between the INO and the CSP. The 
objectives are to explore the cryptographic facts and 
principles and successively refine to eliminate pitfalls 
hampering the secure channel between the INO and the 
CSP. We aim to propose an analytically sound protocol.
B. Notation of the Proposed Scheme
To understand the protocol, following notations have 
been used in the figure(s):
IV. SECURE INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN INO AND CSP
Security has main properties like Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability [8-9]. Confidentiality refers to 
the mechanism whereby information is disclosed only to 
authorized party [8-9]. In other words, confidentiality means 
keeping information or communication from being seen by 
an adversary [10]. Integrity of information is the 
characteristics that changes can be made only by INO in 
authorized way [9]. Availability refers to timely response to 
the request of service demanded [8-9].
Interception is the situation that an adversary can gain 
access to a service or data or information [9]. Interception 
causes the breach of confidentiality.
Interruption is the situation in which information or data or 
service is unavailable due to the fact that file or information 
or data is lost or corrupted. Denial of Service (DoS) or 
Distributed DoS attacks by adversaries are threats and 
known as interruptions and they make service or 
information inaccessible to the legitimate INO [9].
Interruption causes the breach of availability. Modification
involves unauthorized changing of information or tampering 
with data or information so that the information or data no 
longer remains in original specification [9]. Fabrication
refers to situation in which additional data or activity is 
generated that would normally not exist [9].
There are following types of security mechanisms:
Encryption transforms data or information into something 
that an attacker or adversary cannot understand. Encryption 
provides a means to implement data confidentiality [9].
Authentication is used to verify the claimed identity of an 
information owner or user or other entity [9]. Authentication 
proves “who you are” [10]. Authorization follows 
authentication. Authorization defines or deals with what are 
actions allowed to be performed by an information owner or 
user once s/he is authenticated [9-10].
The following cryptographic principles lead to the 
protocol devised in step by step manner for establishing 
secure channel between the INO and the CSP.
Principle of Secret Key Cryptography (SKC) or 
Symmetric Cryptography (SC) employs the same key for 
encryption and decryption as shown below.
Figure 2. Secret Key or Symmetric Cryptography.
decryption
Plain text Cipher text
Plain textCipher text
encryption
key
Token : a pair of username, password and session key.
KwT : represents a specific key where
w : i|c (I for INO, c for CSP).
T : +|- ( + for public key and – for private key). 
Ki+ : Information owner’s  public key.
Ki- : Information owner’s  private key.   
Kc+ : CSP’s  public key.  
Kc- : CSP’s  private key.
E(m) KwT : message is encrypted with KwT.
S(m) KwT : message is signed with KwT.
Ski : Secret key generated randomly by INO. 
Skic : Secret key shared by INO and CSP. 
[I, C] : INO wants to communicate with CSP.
I : INO’s ID (Identity).
C : CSP’s ID (Identity).
KDC : Key Distribution Centre
Ki,kdc : Secret Key between INO and KDC
Kc,kdc : Secret Key between CSP and KDC
Cloud storage
                      cloud
Cloud storage
INO CSP
SaaS
PaaS
IaaS
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Securing storage on insecure media can be achieved by 
inventing secret key or key to encrypt the information and 
store this information anywhere so long as the key is 
retained and remembered by the information owner [10].
Strong authentication proves the secrecy without 
revealing the secrecy and gets useful when two entities 
(computers or people or agents) communicate in un-trusted
environment like the Cloud Computing one [10]. The 
scenario is shown in the following figure after applying such 
a mechanism of strong authentication in Cloud Computing 
Environment.
                                                   
Figure 3. INO and CSP use challenge-response authentication.
Public Key Cryptography (PKC) is also referred to as 
Asymmetric Cryptography (AC) that has two keys private 
key denoted by d and public key denoted by e as opposed to 
single shared key in Secret Key Cryptography. 
Figure 4. Public Key or Asymmetric Cryptography.
Figure 5. Digital Signature.
Digital Signature is generated with PKC by someone 
knowing the private key. An INO can sign its information or 
data by generating a signature with his or her private key
and other entity like CSP can verify that it is the signature of 
so and so INO, but cannot modify the INO’s signature [10].
As PKC is order of magnitude slower than SKC, for 
performance, information is not first encrypted with public 
key of PKC. Rather, information is encrypted with a 
randomly generated secret key. Then the secret key is 
encrypted with public key. Only INO can reveal the secret 
key by decrypting it with only the private key solely known 
to the INO and then decrypting the information with the 
secret key.
Figure 6. INO is authenticated by CSP based on the outcome of the 
encryption or hash.
An adversary can see both R and f(Skic, R). It is essential 
that seeing or overhearing the pair does not enable the 
adversary to derive Skic. This protocol is an improvement 
over password.  Overhearing or seeing the exchange, an 
adversary cannot impersonate the INO or the CSP as there 
will be a different challenge in the next interaction.
However, this above protocol has some limitations:
i. Here authentication is not mutual. While the INO is 
authenticated by the CSP, the INO does not authenticate 
the CSP. If an adversary can receive packets transmitted 
to CSP’s network address through address spoofing (an
adversary through other means can try to convince the 
INO that the adversary’s address is the CSP’s address), 
then the INO will be trapped into assuming that the 
adversary is the CSP. An adversary does not need to 
know INO’s secret in order to impersonate the CSP. 
Here the adversary needs to send any old R as challenge 
to the INO and ignore the INO’s response.   
ii. If the remainder of the exchange is transmitted without 
cryptographic protection, an eavesdropper or adversary 
can hijack or spoof the exchanges after the initial 
exchange. The adversary can generate packets with 
INO’s source address irrespective of receiving packets 
transmitted to the INO’s network layer address.
iii. Assuming Skic derived from password and knowing R 
and f(Skic, R), an adversary can mount off-line password 
guessing attack. 
Figure 7. INO is authenticated by CSP based on Skic.
rc
ri encrypted with KIC 
ri
rc encrypted with KIC 
ri and  rc are random numbers chosen randomly by INO (Information
Owner) and CSP (Cloud Service Provider) respectively. Each such random 
number is known as a challenge. The value x encrypted with the secret key
KIC is called response to the challenge x. If last encryption is successful
then INO and CSP are authenticated
decryption
Plain text Cipher text
encryption
Cipher text Plain text
verification
Plain text Signed text
Signing
public key
Signed text Plain text
INO CSP
public key
private key
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+: Information Owner
a challenge R: a random number, R
f(Skic, R): CSP authenticates INO
E(Token)Kc+ is in the light of Public Key or Asymmetric Cryptography where 
Kc+ is known to the information owner and the CSP decrypts this by using 
its Kc-.   A challenge R(a random number) is from the CSP to be sure of the 
information owner when the information owner sends back the R with the 
shared secret key Skic.  f(Skic, R) is a function like either R is encrypted with
Skic   ie, E(R)Skic or R is hashed with Skic ie, hash(Skic, R). This way, INO
is authenticated by CSP based on Skic.              
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+: Information Owner 
E(R)Skic: encrypt the challenge R 
Kc+ is known to the information owner. E(Token)Kc+ sent in the light of
Public Key or Asymmetric Cryptography is decrypted by the CSP using its
Kc-. In E(R)Skic, the challenge R is encrypted with the shared secret key
Skic. Upon decryption, R is sent to CSP in token of the fact that the INO is a
known entity to the CSP. This way, INO is authenticated by CSP based on
Skic.              
R: challenge sent to CSP 
private key
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Figure 8. INO is authenticated by CSP based on timestamp and  Skic.
Figure 9. CSP authenticates INO based on INO’s public key.
In the above protocol of applying one-way Public Key, 
there remains a potential problem. Here, an adversary can 
trick the INO into signing something. Impersonating the 
CSP’s network address, an adversary can wait for the INO
to login and give the INO a quantity as the challenge. The 
INO signs the challenge using the private key of the INO.
In the following protocol, impersonating the CSP’s 
network address, an adversary can wait for the INO to login 
and can have the INO decrypt the encrypted message for the 
adversary.
The solution is that INO must not use the same key for 
two different purposes unless the design for all uses of the 
key are coordinated so that an attacker cannot use one 
protocol to help break another. 
Figure 10. CSP authenticates INO.
Figure 11. Mutual authentication between CSP and INO based on 
shared secret key SKic.
Initialized with the Public Key Cryptography, the  
mutual authentication is achieved between INO and CSP 
using shared key (Figure 11 and Figure 12).
Figure 12. Optimized Mutual authentication between CSP and INO.
The above protocol has a security pitfall known as 
reflection attack. In such an attack, an adversary can 
impersonate INO to CSP (adversary makes the CSP believe 
that the CSP is in communication with the INO). 
Figure 13. Reflection attacks in Optimized Mutual authentication.
ADV starts out sending INO’s identity along with a 
challenge R2. CSP returns challenge R1 and the response 
f(Skic, R2). ADV does not have Skic and it sets up a new 
channel to let the CSP do encryption for it (ADV). 
Therefore, in the 2nd session, ADV does the same as the 1st
session with R1 instead of R2. The CSP, not recognizing 
that it had used R1 before as a challenge, responds with 
f(Skic, R1) at the end of the 2nd session along with a new 
challenge R3. At this point, ADV gets f(Skic, R1) and 
finishes setting up the 1st session by returning the last 
message containing the response f(Skic, R1) which was 
originally requested  from the 2nd message in the 1st session.
The above reflection or replay problem can be solved by 
employing different keys and challenges. Different keys for 
authentication are like the key used to authenticate INO is 
suggested to be different from the key used to authenticate 
CSP. At the cost of additional configuration and storage, 
there could be a means to derive the key used to authenticate 
CSP from the key used to authenticate INO. For example, 
CSP’s key might be like  -Skic or Skic+1 or -Skic (+)[XORed] 
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+: Information Owner
E(Token)Kc+ sent (where Kc+ is known to the INO) is decrypted by the CSP
using its Kc-. In E(timestamp)Skic, the challenge R=timestamp is encrypted
with the shared secret key Skic. Here, handshakes in protocol have been
shortened. This way, INO is authenticated by CSP based on synchronized 
clock and shared key SKic. This protocol is now more efficient by saving
additional exchanges. An adversary can use INO’s information to
impersonate INO within acceptable clock skew.           
E(timestamp)SKic: encrypt current time
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+: Information Owner
R: a random number R is a challenge
With Kc+ known to the INO, E(Token)Kc+ is sent. The CSP decrypts this by
using its Kc-. A random number R is a challenge. In S(R)Ki-, R is signed by
the INO using Ki- and sent to the CSP. Upon verification of the INO’s
signature S(R)Ki- using the  Ki+,  R is compared by the CSP to the one held
in the CSP. Thereby, the CSP recognizes or authenticates the INO.
S(R)Ki-: R is signed by INO and sent to CSP
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+: Information Owner
E(R)Ki+: challenge R is encrypted
In E(Token)Kc+, Kc+ is known to the INO. The CSP decrypts this by using its
Kc-. A random number R is a challenge and it is encrypted with Ki+ by the
CSP. Upon decryption by the INO, R is sent to the CSP in token of the fact
that the INO is a known entity to the CSP which, in this way, authenticates
the INO.              
R: INO is to decrypt the encrypted R with  Ki-
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+: Information Owner 
R2: a random number R2 is a challenge  
For Kc+ known to the INO, the CSP decrypt this E(Token)Kc+ by using its Kc-.
Random numbers R1, R2 are challenges.  R1 can be encrypted with Ki+ by 
the CSP, i.e., E(R1)i+. f(Skic, R) is a function in which either R is encrypted
with shared secret key Skic  ie, E(R)Skic  or R is hashed with Skic ie,
hash(Skic, R). Mutual authentication between the CSP and the INO is 
based on  Skic.
R1: a challenge R1 is a random number 
f(Skic, R1): CSP authenticates INO 
f(Skic, R2): INO authenticates CSP
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+ , R2: INO’s credentials and R2
R1, f(Skic, R2)
f(Skic, R1)
With Kc+ known to the information owner, E(Token)Kc+ sent in the light of
Public Key or Asymmetric Cryptography is decrypted by the CSP using its 
Kc-. A random number R1 being a challenge is encrypted with Ki+ by the 
CSP in Public Key Cryptography, ie, E(R)Ki+. f(Skic, R) is a function in 
which either R is encrypted with shared secret key Skic   ie, E(R)Skic or R is 
hashed with Skic ie, hash(Skic, R ). Mutual authentication between the CSP 
and the INO is based on  Skic
ADV CSP
R1, f(Skic, R2)
ADV cannot proceed further as it cannot encrypt R1.
However, ADV has got the CSP to encrypt R1 for it (ADV).
ADV stands for an Adversary. E(Token)Kc+ is sent in the light of Public Key
or Asymmetric Cryptography where Kc+ is known to the information owner.
The CSP decrypts this E(Token)Kc+ by using its Kc-. Random numbers R1
and R2  are  challenges. f(Skic, R) is a function representing the fact that
either R is encrypted with shared secret key Skic   ie, E(R)Skic or  R is hashed
with Skic ie, hash(Skic, R).  Here, the CSP can terminate further interaction
as soon as it gets R1 devoid of encryption in the 1st message of the 2nd
session. 
E(Token)Kc+, R1: INO’s credentials and R2
R3, f(Skic, R1)
INO
f(Skic, R1): INO’s credentials and R2
1
S
T
2
nd
1
S
T
E(Token)Kc+, R2: INO’s credentials and R2
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with F0F0F0F0F0F0F0F016.  Different challenges are like 
the challenge (suppose, a long odd number) initiated by INO 
is suggested to be different from the challenge (definitely, 
long even number) responded by the responder (CSP). After 
receiving a long even number, if an adversary responds with 
the even one, then CSP must recognize that there exists 
something malicious. 
Figure 14. Optimized Mutual authentication on each other’s public key.
Mutual authentication by public keys has some 
limitations or challenges. 
How does the INO or  the workstation know the CSP’s 
public keys? Neither INO nor INO’s workstation is going to 
remember or have the CSP’s public key stored respectively.
As a pervasive nature of Cloud Computing 
Environment, the INO is to get into the CSP from anywhere. 
The above problem could be solved by a trusted entity
coupling the domain of the INO and that of the CSP. One 
entity handles all INOs’ domain and the other entity handles
the CSP to which the information owners belong for 
services.
Also there is a problem of having the INO’s workstation 
obtain the INO’s private key as the INO knows only a single 
password that was supplied as a Token or a credential. 
These problems can be solved by encrypting the public key 
of the CSP with the INO’s password and the INO’s private 
key encrypted with the INO’s password. These are stored 
with information. If an adversary impersonates CSP, that
adversary will not be able to give INO a quantity encrypted 
with INO’s password. Another form of Mutual 
Authentication using Public Key Cryptography is as 
follows.
Figure 15. Optimized Mutual authentication between CSP and INO 
based on each other’s public key supported by the session key.
To get rid of the problems as found in the above 
derivatives, a concept of Mediated Authentication with Key 
Distribution Centre, as shown in Figure 16, has been taken 
into consideration with Cloud Computing Environment into 
perspective. For dealing with huge secret keys without 
hassle, a centralized approach by means of a Key 
Distribution Centre manages n keys instead of n(n-1)/2, 
which is clearly an improvement over the situation handled 
without any entity like KDC [9]. An INO registered with the 
KDC can maintain a secure channel or path with the KDC 
and authenticate each other [9-10].
Figure 16. KDC operation in principle.
This above protocol has a problem when INO, 
immediately after getting the key (Kic) sends a message to 
the CSP before the CSP gets the shared key from the KDC. 
This problem would also put KDC into trouble for initiating 
a connection for the CSP. This problem can be 
circumvented if the KDC just passes E(Kic)Kc,kdc back to the 
INO. This message containing the E(Kic)Kc,kdc to the INO is 
called ticket. The ticket is information that will allow INO to 
access CSP. INO will pass this ticket to the CSP while 
communicating with the CSP as shown below.
Figure 17. KDC operation using ticket and letting INO set up 
a connection with CSP.
Maintaining authentication and confidentiality is shown 
in the following figure. Authentication of information 
owner’s data or message or information is maintained by 
signing it with private key of information owner and 
verifying the authentication by the public key of the 
information owner [9,11].
Figure 18. Maintaining authentication and confidentiality in the channel 
between INO and CSP.
Confidentiality ensures that message cannot be 
intercepted or read or understood by an adversary. 
Confidentiality of the information is established by 
INO CSP
E(Token)Kc+, E(R2)Kc+
R2, E(R1)Ki+
R1
The CSP decrypts this E(Token)Kc+ by using its Kc- and due to Public Key
Cryptography Kc+ is known to the INO. A random number R2 is a challenge
and encrypted with Kc+ so that the CSP can decrypt it using the Kc-. R1 is
encrypted with Ki+ by the CSP in Public Key Cryptography,    ie, E(R1)Ki+ is
sent to the INO along with decrypted R2. Mutual authentication between
the CSP  and the INO is based each other’s public key.
INO CSP
E(Tokeni, Ri)Kc+
E( Ri, Rc, Kic)Ki+      Kic is session key
E(Rc)Kic
Mutual authentication between the CSP and the INO is based each other’s
public key supported by the session key. INO will decrypt E(Ri, Rc, Kic)Ki+
using INO’s Ki- ie, private key of INO. INO returns the response to the
CSP’s challenge using the session key to prove that it is actually INO to 
whom CSP is maintaining secure channel.
[I,C]
E(Kic)Ki,kdc E(Kic)Kc,kdc
INO CSP
[I,C]
E(Kic)Ki,kdc                    E(Kic)Kc,kdc
KDC, generates Kic
E(Kic)Kc,kdc
E(Token)Kc+   E(Kic)Kc,kdc
ticket
INO CSPKDC, generates Kic
M
essage 
C
onfidentiality
M
essage 
A
uthentication
INO CSP
Encrypt by Ki-
Plain m
E(m)Ki-
Encrypt again by Kc+
E(m, E(m)Ki-)Kc+
Encrypted  m Encrypted  m
Decrypt by Kc-
D(E(m, E(m)Ki-)Kc+)Kc-
Decrypt by Ki+
D(E(m)Ki-)Ki+
Plain m
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encrypting a message before sending it [9,11]. Here INO’s 
signing or signature or encryption by the INO’s private key
(Ki-) holds as long as the private key remains a secret and 
this signing is an authentication for integrity [9-10].
Authentication done by signing with private key prevents 
modification. When a private key is changed, message sent 
by encrypting or signing with private becomes worthless 
and in such a case a central authority is needed to keep track 
of when keys are changed [9]. Although public key 
operations are computationally expensive, encryption with 
public key is for confidentiality. 
A better option than digital signature or encrypting with 
private key is the message digest. Message digest is a fixed 
length bit string h that is computed from an arbitrary length 
message m by means of cryptographic hash function H.
Message digest, h=H(m).  If m is changed to m’, then H(m’) 
will be different form H(m) and it can easily be detected that 
a modification has taken place. To digitally sign a message, 
INO will 
i. compute a message digest 
ii. encrypt the message digest with the INO’s private key
iii. send message or information itself as plain text along 
with the message digest as   separate information. 
For ensuring confidentiality, this message could be 
encrypted with the CSP’s public key. CSP then 
i. receives the encrypted message and digest.
ii. decrypts the encrypted message and the encrypted 
digest using the private key of the CSP and the public 
key of the INO respectively.
iii. separately calculates the message digest of the message
decrypted.  Then matches it with the decrypted message 
digest.
To achieve confidentiality at minute level, the following 
authentication mechanism has been portrayed eliminating 
the pitfalls found in earlier illustrations. 
Figure 19 shows single sign on mechanism for any client 
like INO. Servers delegate client authentication to AS
(Application Server) and TGS (Ticket Granting Server).
Requests are accepted from a registered (account with user 
id) client like INO having a valid ticket. TGS acts like KDC.
Application Server (AS), in Figure 19, is designated for 
handling a login request from a user. It authenticates a user 
and provides a key that can be used to set up a secure 
channel with servers.  Setting up a secure channel is done by 
TGS (Figure 19). TGS provides special message (aka 
ticket).  Tickets are used to convince servers that the client 
is who really he or she claims to be.
Here login is a process like INO is typing in INO’s name 
or user id (uid) at a workstation that is available anywhere.   
Then INO’s uid is sent to AS which is involved with the 
following issues. 
i. Session key Ki,TGS that is used for confidentiality of 
message and discarded when the secure channel is no 
longer used and thereby session key used per session in 
secure communication channel setup protects 
communication parties like the INO and the CSP etc 
from replaying attack [9-10].
ii. Ticket is found by encrypting session key and uid with 
secret key KAS, TGS  i.e., ticket is E(uid, Ki, TGS)KAS, TGS.
iii. To ensure confidentiality and trust, session key and 
ticket are encrypted with secret key between INO and 
AS i.e., Ki, AS.
An workstation, on receiving E(Ki, TGS, E(uid, Ki, TGS  
)KAS, TGS)Ki, AS from AS, prompts a password for INO. This 
password is used to generate the shared secret key Ki, AS.
Shared secret key is generated by taking a character string 
password as shown by PWD in Figure 19 and applying 
cryptographic hash and then taking the first 55 characters as 
the secret key. Here INO’s password is not sent as plaintext 
and workstation does not have to temporarily store it. 
As soon as the shared key  Ki, AS is generated, the 
workstation gets the session key Ki, TGS and INO’s password 
and use only the shared secret key Ki, AS [9]. After this part
of authentication, INO is logged into the system through the 
current workstation and  the ticket received from the AS is 
stored temporarily and used for accessing remote service 
and INO destroy all cached ticket before leaving the 
workstation [9]. The INO possessing the ticket like E(uid, 
Ki, TGS)KAS, TGS proves that the INO is genuine. The TGS 
responds with a session key Ki,c .
V. PROVIDING DYNAMIC INFORMATION HANDLING 
SUPPORT
In our proposed protocol scheme, session key is 
maintained as long as the secure connection remains in 
effect. As soon as a session breaks, a new session is
supported with a session key generated from AS(Figure 19).
Session keys, tickets and delegation of authentication to the 
AS and TGS (Figure 19) work in coherent and dynamic 
manner to ensure security i.e, confidentiality and trust in the 
Cloud Computing Environment.
VI. IMPROVEMENT OVER SSL AND SECURITY STRENGTH 
ANALYSIS
SSL provides means for communication on top of 
transport layer [9-10]. To an INO’s request for secure 
session using HTTPS of application layer, SSL, if employed 
in the Cloud Computing Environment, makes the CSP issue 
x.509 certificates (from trusted third party certificates 
authorities (CAs)). The response of the CSP contains the 
public key of the CSP server among other things. INO can 
now accept or reject by comparing with the list of trusted 
CAs stored in the INO’s workstation. Upon successful 
matching, INO accepts the public key of the CSP and 
generates a random symmetric key that is sent to the CSP by 
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encrypting with the public key of the CSP. Both the INO 
and the CSP know the symmetric key now. INO can encrypt 
information using symmetric key and send it to the CSP as 
long as the session exists. Man-in-the-middle attacks, 
session hijacking [32-34] are some of the pitfalls in SSL or 
TLS. An adversary, in our proposed protocol scheme, needs 
to get session key and ticket by surpassing cryptographic 
protections whereas in SSL, only symmetric key once 
detected by an adversary can cause replay attacks in the 
form of man-in-the-middle attacks. However, session key, 
ticket and key handling have been arranged and protected in 
our protocol scheme through cryptographic maneuvers.
Several handshaking features among INO, CSP, AS and 
TGS are needed to be observed and dissolved by an 
adversary to get the session key and ticket (Figure 19) for 
breaking the secure channel. This secure channel for the 
INO to retain the control over data or information and 
maintain the confidentiality of the data or information also 
ensures trust.  This protocol scheme as depicted in Figure 19 
is a notion out of yet-to-be-found motions towards 
intelligent innovation in instantaneous security in the Cloud 
Computing Environment.
VII. MOTIVATION AND RELATED WORK
C. Wang et al. [12] have discussed data storage security 
while assuming secure communication channel into reality. 
In our perspective, secure channel at every step is a 
precondition to justify all other security matters in the cloud 
computing environment. Our work has gone a long to 
vividly pinpoint that establishing a secure channel by means 
of cryptographic principles of authentication can be a source
of intelligent security to be applied on the fly. W. Wang et 
al. [12] have highlighted cryptographic maneuver for 
probable data possession by owner-write-and-user read and 
key management and hinted for many-write-many-read 
feature.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Secure trusted path or channel between INO and CSP in 
the Cloud Computing Environment (CCE) has been put into 
the focus of minute exploration. As a derivative of the 
thought, cryptographic authentication has been taken into 
consideration based on the literature and texts explored.
Taking literature review, underlying architectural and 
operational mechanism of the CCE into minute account, we, 
to the best of our knowledge, are the first to propose the 
protocol for secure trusted path befitting the CCE. To 
propose this protocol, a successively refined mechanism has 
been shown keeping the dynamic nature of the CCE in 
perspective. However, a thorough experimental proof and 
outcome relating to the robustness of the protocols and 
reduction of the session key and ticket generation time 
respectively are yet to be contemplated. Besides, 
cryptographic innovation and intelligence to the information 
on the fly while transferring information between INO and 
CSP is the future derivative of the present work.  Entities 
like AS and TGS as incorporated in our proposed protocol 
scheme are yet to be further made resilient and trusted in 
compromised and devastated situations to be envisaged. An 
experimental outcome showing the analytically found 
improvement of our scheme over SSL is yet to be done 
along the line of confidentiality in setting up secure trusted 
channel between INO and CSP.
Our work has been motivated along this path with a salient 
protocol to implement the inherent theme of above feature. 
[2, 13-31] take security of outsourced data or information,
information owner’s control over his or her information, 
confidentiality into consideration in general.  Our work is 
based on the hints outlined in prior works [2, 13-31] and 
therefore our proposed scheme in the form of protocol 
goes a long way to give clues to the solution of the 
problems being sought.
PWD
E(uid, Ki,c )KC, TGS , E(t) Ki,c
E(C, Ki,c ) Ki, TGS , E(uid, Ki,c )KC, TGS
INO 
uid
INO’s 
Workstation
AS
Application Server
TGS
Ticket Granting Server
E(Ki, TGS ,
E(uid, Ki, TGS
       )KAS, TGS
)Ki, AS
CSP C
Password is 
prompted by 
workstation
Set up secure channel with CSP.
E(uid, Ki, TGS )KAS, TGS , C, E(t)Ki, TGS
Ticket E(uid, Ki, TGS )KAS, TGS
Further encryption with Ki, AS for confidentiality 
INO from his or her current workstation or terminal wants to 
set up a secure channel with CSP by encrypted timestamp t 
to get rid of replaying attack by an adversary. 
E(
uid,Ki,c
)KC, TGS
After verifying the timestamp, the TGS informs CSP about 
INO’s forthcoming communication with CSP over secure 
channel to be maintained by secret key Ki,c. TGS returns a
ticket to INO. If the timestamp differs more than a few 
minutes from the current time according to synchronized 
clock, request for a ticket is discarded.
login uid
session key Ki, TGS
E(uid, Ki,c)KC, TGS is a ticket that will be used by INO to send 
message to CSP along with encrypted timestamp.E(t+1) Ki,c
After successful verification of timestamp, CSP is sure about 
INO and responds with  E(t+1)Ki,c to prove to INO that
responder is indeed CSP. 
CSP, on decrypting the  ticket E(uid, Ki,c)KC, TGS   finds that
INO is in line for the CSP as the TGS has created ticket on
request of the INO for connecting with CSP. CSP also finds 
the secret key Ki,c. CSP verifies the timestamp. 
Figure 19. AS and TGS delegated with client authentication for single sign on.
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